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WAY OF NECESSITY: SHOULD BLOKLAND EVER BE LEFT 
STERILE?
Jackson NO v Aventura Ltd 2005 2 All SA 518 (C) and its sequel Aventura Ltd v 
Jackson NO 2007 5 SA 497 (SCA)
  General
Jackson NO v Aventura Ltd decided in the Cape high court and its sequel in the su-
preme court of appeal, Aventura Ltd v Jackson NO, raise interesting questions about 
undeveloped mountainous agricultural properties being converted to holiday re-
sorts or private family vacation areas without providing a sufficient exit to a public 
road. In the present case the dominant land concerned was landlocked or “blokland” 
– ie enclosed on all sides by neighbouring land without an exit to a public road. Ac-
cording to case law on via necessitatis this is a classic example where the owner of 
the dominant land would be entitled to a way of necessity to a public road in order 
to exploit the dominant land to its full potential. This case is, however, complicated 
by the fact that the property concerned as well as all the surrounding properties 
have been declared sensitive coastal areas in terms of regulations (reg 1526 of 27 
Nov 1998) promulgated under the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989, which 
prohibit the disturbance of vegetation and earthworks in these areas and the con-
struction of a road without the consent of the environmental authorities concerned. 
Consequently the court was faced with the dilemma of whether to decide the issue 
on common law principles alone or whether it was competent to take environmental 
issues into account in its decision to grant or not to grant a way of necessity.
Other issues that were raised or could have been raised were whether the grant-
ing of a way of necessity entitles the owner of dominant land to convert the way 
of necessity into an ordinary permanent praedial servitude. If this is the case, the 
servitude of way could be registered and the ordinary rules applicable to praedial 
servitudes would apply to the way in which it must be exercised. Another pertinent 
question not raised by the judges was whether a way of necessity was competent 
only to further agricultural purposes or whether it could also promote more esoteric 
exploitation of the dominant property for more recreational purposes. An interest-
ing related question is whether the owners of the dominant land should be awarded a 
way of necessity to be used only in emergency situations (via necessitatis precario) 
rather than a full way of necessity (via plenum). It could also be enquired whether 
the compensation that has to be paid by the landowner who benefits from the way of 
necessity must be agreed upon by the parties or set by the court. Finally, the ques-
tion could be raised whether in view of section 25 of the constitution landlocked 
property could ever be left sterile because environmental authorities are not pre-
pared to authorise the construction of an exit road to the nearest public road.
2  Facts of the case
In 1992 the trustees of the Rondeklip Investment Trust acquired a portion of unde-
veloped farmland that will be referred to as the Rondeklip property. The property, 
situated in the division of Knysna, is adjacent to the Keurbooms Forest Reserve 
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and is covered by pristine indigenous forest and bush. The Rondeklip property is 
landlocked in the sense that it has no access to a public road. Access to the prop-
erty is only possible by crossing either one or both adjoining properties. A large 
undeveloped portion of land (Catwalk property) adjoins the Rondeklip property on 
the west while the Aventura property owned by the defendants (appellants in the 
supreme court of appeal) forms the southern boundary. The latter property is being 
developed as a recreational resort. It is common cause that the Rondeklip property 
as well as the surrounding Aventura and Catwalk properties have been declared 
sensitive coastal areas under the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989 (s 21). 
Regulations promulgated under this act purport to preserve the sensitive ecological 
balance in the area by prohibiting disturbance of the vegetation, earthworks and the 
construction of roads.
Apparently the Rondeklip property was proclaimed a private nature reserve prior 
to 1997. Under the relevant town planning scheme as it applied in 1997, the trust 
had a right to erect at least one dwelling for primary use on the land (528e-g, but 
see the SCA report 499G which states that the town planning scheme allows the use 
of the land as agricultural property and allows the erection of one dwelling on the 
property). It is not disputed that the use of the Rondeklip property for the purposes 
for which it is zoned will require prior authorisation by the environmental authori-
ties contemplated by the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989 and the National 
Management Act 107 of 1998 (521 and SCA report 499G).
In the court a quo the trust sought an order from the Cape high court compelling 
Aventura to register a right of way in favour of the Rondeklip property over its land. 
The trust claimed that they required vehicular and other access by means of a road 
3,5 metres in width to the southeastern portion of the dominant land from the near-
est public road adjoining the defendant’s Aventura property. The trust contended 
that such road would allow the plaintiffs to enjoy the landlocked property and in fu-
ture to erect one or two dwellings on that portion to be used and enjoyed by the per-
sons concerned for private holiday purposes (522). They averred that no other public 
road was within reasonable reach of the dominant land and that the most practical 
access to the dominant land from the nearest public road would cross the Aventura 
property. The Aventura property is situated along the national road to Humansdorp. 
From the national road, a private road has been constructed to the entrance of the 
recreational resort on the Aventura property. This resort comprises a cluster of cha-
lets and other buildings. From the entrance of the resort a lightly constructed tarred 
road provides access to the chalets. A natural watercourse located mainly on the 
adjoining Catwalk property that extends into the surrounding hills bounds the fur-
thermost chalet. The right of way requested by the trust allows for passage from 
the national road, along the private road described above to a point short of the fur-
thermost chalet. From that point it moves away from the tarred road, by-passes the 
furthermost chalet, crosses about 30 metres of pristine land and enters the Catwalk 
property near the foot of the watercourse. From there it proceeds up the watercourse 
along the route of a servitude of right of way over the Catwalk property registered in 
favour of the Rondeklip property, until it enters the Rondeklip property.
It was contemplated that the trust would construct a road over the last 30 metres 
of the Aventura property and along the remainder of the route up to the Rondeklip 
property (see SCA report 499D-E). This would require the grading only of the 30 
metres extension over the Aventura property and would mean that the proposed 
route would not in any way interfere with the buildings on the property or diminish 
the beneficial use of the Aventura property or the private roads thereon (523). The 
defendants denied that the public road to Humansdorp was the nearest national road 
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to the landlocked property and suggested two alternative access roads that would 
traverse the Catwalk property and link up with the Wittedrift national road without 
traversing the Aventura property. They further averred that the construction of the 
proposed road would involve the destruction of highly sensitive and protected forest 
areas and that such activity could not be undertaken without authorisation of the 
environmental authorities concerned.
  Decision of the Cape high court
Zondi AJ accepted that the dispute involved the consideration of both environmen-
tal issues and common law principles (523). Since the properties concerned had 
been declared sensitive coastal areas the likely destructive effect of the construc-
tion of the proposed road would require consent from the authorities concerned. 
The defendant’s expert land surveyor testified that the plaintiffs’ proposed road was 
environmentally inappropriate and that its construction would be “inappropriate, ill 
conceived and ecologically irresponsible”. In view of the ecological features of the 
properties concerned, it was not the most practical access to the landlocked prop-
erty. By contrast, the roads proposed by the defendant were testified to be consider-
ably less damaging to the natural environment, as they are much higher up in the 
catchment and situated on a spur rather than in a valley (526).
The court, however, found it inappropriate to pronounce on the complex nature 
of the environmental legislation and to give a decision on both common law and 
environmental issues. The judge reasoned that it is the function of the court to de-
cide common law issues, namely the possible acquisition of a way of necessity. If 
the plaintiffs succeed in acquiring a right of way they would have to comply with 
the necessary environmental legislation when they want to exercise that right. He 
reasoned as follows:
“A totally different body is tasked by the legislature to deal with issues regarding the compliance 
with the provisions of environmental legislation. If the Court were to apply environmental con-
siderations in determining the issues between the parties, it will be usurping the powers of the 
administrative bodies who, by reason of their expertise, are empowered to exercise those powers” 
(531d-f).
Having discussed the applicable environmental statutory provisions at length, he 
concluded:
“Thus if a court in a claim to a right of way, were to apply both the common law and environmental 
considerations in considering the claim, the whole environmental legislative framework would be 
rendered nugatory. Clearly that would never have been the intention of the legislature to do so. The 
legislature has created and authorized various administrative bodies with necessary expertise on 
environment issues to regulate the exercise of the right …. At this stage of the process the claim has 
no effect on the environment” (532).
Zondi AJ also dealt with the contention by the defendants that the evidence that 
the road proposed by the plaintiffs was unfeasible both from an engineering and 
environmental perspective made it highly unlikely that the plaintiffs would obtain 
the necessary authorisation. The defendants quoted various authorities in support 
of their contention that the court should not deal with or pronounce upon abstract 
or academic points of law (528). Zondi AJ countered this by reference to section 
19(1)(a)(iii) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959, which gives a provincial or lo-
cal division a discretion, at the instance of any interested person, “to enquire into 
and determine any existing, future or contingent right or obligation, notwithstand-
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ing that such person cannot claim any relief consequential upon determination”. 
He pointed out that there was a real and pertinent dispute between the parties on 
whether or not the plaintiffs should be granted a right of way over the defendants’ 
property. Although if granted, the plaintiffs might not be able to exercise that right 
on account of environmental requirements pertaining to sensitive coastal areas, he 
concluded that this did not mean that the questions presented were abstract, aca-
demic or hypothetical (529).
Thus Zondi AJ cleared the way for deciding the issue on common law princi-
ples applicable to ways of necessity. He examined the expert evidence given by the 
engineers and environmentalists on both sides (524-526) and concluded that the is-
sues had to be determined in the light of the geographical location of the plaintiff’s 
property as well as the conflicting interests of the parties concerned. The plaintiffs 
had a real right (ownership) in the landlocked land that cannot be exercised to its 
full potential without an access to the southeastern part of their property where 
they could build a house on a flatter site offering the best view. At the same time 
the defendants were entitled to the full ownership of their property, and this would 
certainly be diminished if the right of way were to be granted (527).
The judge referred to the locus classicus in Van Rensburg v Coetzee 979  SA 
655 (A) 671 that the owner of landlocked land could claim a way of necessity if his 
land is landlocked and has no way out or if an exit is in fact available but is inade-
quate in that the owner does not have reasonably sufficient access to the public road 
to enable him, if he is a farmer, to carry out his farming operations (the last part with 
reference to Lentz v Mullin 1921 EDC 268 270). In such a case the owner is entitled 
to an exit to the public road against payment of a reasonable price. The route the 
way of necessity must take must be determined by the ter naaste lager en minster 
schade maxim that means that such way must traverse the adjoining land that lies 
between the landlocked and the nearest public road and along a route on that land 
which causes the least damage to the servient land (529). He quoted a dictum in Van 
Rensburg v Coetzee to the effect that such a maxim was not inflexible and could be 
deviated from if the servient land was so impassable that it provides no practical exit 
or if the land concerned would be so detrimentally affected by the granting of the 
way of necessity that another neighbouring property must be considered as servient 
land (529-530).
Zondi AJ then found that the dominant land was geographically landlocked, 
which made the need for access clear. He also found that the close proximity of the 
defendants’ property to the national road made it the most likely candidate to pro-
vide the landlocked property with access to the public road in line with the maxim 
ter naaster lage en minster schaden (528). In this context it must be remembered 
that the direct route to the nearest boundary of Rondeklip property was much nearer 
than the route eventually decided upon but that the steep terrain made it impossible 
to construct a road in that area. Applying the first exception mentioned in the Van 
Rensburg case, the judge reasoned that topographical and geographical features 
of both the servient land and the dominant land (for instance if there was a ra-
vine between the two properties) must be considered in order to determine whether 
the proposed servient land was so impassable that it provided no practical exit. He 
then concluded (531) that, in his opinion, environmental and engineering difficul-
ties should not be taken into account in determining whether or not the identified 
land will be impassable. This is controversial because engineering difficulties in 
constructing a road would be the single most important reason why the servient 
property could qualify as impassable. The second exception concerns the detri-
mental impact the granting of the way of necessity would have on the defendant’s 
TSAR 2008 .  [ISSN 0257 – 7747]
6 VAN DER MERWE
right to use and enjoy the servient land. Since the defendants planned to exploit 
their property as a resort cum conference centre development, they contended that 
the granting of such a way would seriously limit their plans to construct two hotels, 
a conference centre and restaurant, which will involve rerouting of internal roads 
within their resort (532). It was earlier argued that the proposed road would dra-
matically affect the privacy of occupants of the chalet closest to the route and would 
probably require the demolition of that chalet since the space between the chalets, 
existing parking area and electrical boards is severely limited and insufficient to 
allow for the proposed extension road (525).
Zondi AJ reasoned that this matter could be resolved only by balancing the com-
peting interests of the parties to decide on an approach least burdensome to the 
parties (531). The plaintiffs wanted to use the defendants’ existing private access 
road to the border of their property. Since the land there is too steep to gain di-
rect access to the landlocked property, the plaintiffs suggested an access road to 
the registered road servitude that they had established over the other neighbouring 
land, the Catwalk property. This would affect a certain portion of the defendants’ 
property: movements around the chalet closest to the proposed route would affect 
the peace and tranquility in that area. However, the additional route to be built on 
the defendant’s property would only be approximately thirty metres from the point 
where the private road ends (532).
In balancing the parties’ conflicting interests, Zondi AJ considered the viability 
of the routes proposed by the defendants to provide alternative access to the plain-
tiffs’ property. He pointed out that these routes were designed to provide access to 
the northwestern portion of the landlocked land, being the closest portion of the 
landlocked property to the private servitude road connecting the Catwalk property 
to another public road to Wittedrift. Zondi AJ concluded that none of these roads 
would provide access to the spot where the plaintiffs intended to construct a dwell-
ing, namely the southeastern portion of the property where the terrain is less steep 
and the best view is provided. These routes would further require the construction 
and use of a road from the existing road on Catwalk property to the boundary of 
the landlocked property and that construction would have to traverse a ravine over 
steep and extremely difficult terrain (532).
On these facts, Zondi AJ reached the conclusion that the interests of the plaintiff 
could only be protected if they had an exit over the defendants’ property. He there-
fore held that the maxim ter naaster lage en minster schaden applied to the land-
locked land in the present case and that none of the exceptions to the maxim was 
applicable. He decided that the only practical access from the landlocked land to the 
public road was by way of the registered servitude over the Catwalk property and 
the existing road on defendants’ property. Consequently, the plaintiffs were entitled 
to a right of way over the defendants’ property against payment of the amount of 
compensation, which was still to be determined between the parties (532).
To address the concerns of the first defendant that the right of way would adversely 
affect his future development plans and prevent rerouting of the internal roads on 
the property, the judge suggested that a general servitude be granted providing an 
opportunity for the plaintiffs to select a particular route later. This selection should 
then be performed in a civilised way (civiliter modo) (533).
The defendants were also anxious that the routes proposed by the plaintiffs would 
provide access from the national road not only to the plaintiffs’ property but also to 
the Catwalk property. The judge pointed out that such user would not be allowed un-
der the principle that the owner of a dominant tenement cannot transfer the benefit 
of a servitude to another tenement without the consent of the owner of the servient 
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tenement (see Louw v De Villiers (1893) 10 SC 324). To justify this, the judge again 
used the civiliter modo maxim to indicate that the owners of the dominant land 
are required to exercise the servitude over the servient property in a civilised way 
(533).
The court therefore granted an order for the registration of a right of way 3,5 me-
tres in width over the servient tenement in favour of the landlocked property. On the 
authority of Naudé v Ecoman Investments 1994 2 SA 95 (T) 101E-G, the court made 
this subject to the plaintiffs’ compliance with the provisions of the Environment 
Conservation Act 73 of 1989 and the National Environmental Management Act 107 
of 1998 relating to the construction of the road. The question of the reasonable com-
pensation payable by the trust to the defendants (Aventura) was to be determined at 
a later date (534).
  Decision by the supreme court of appeal
The supreme court of appeal per Nugent JA relied on Van Rensburg v Coetzee and 
authorities collected in that judgment for its authority to grant a right of way over 
the property of a non-consenting owner, subject to the payment of appropriate com-
pensation where the necessity exists for the landlocked land to be linked to a public 
road (499H-500B). It rejected the contention of the appellants (Aventura) that until 
such time as the trust obtained authorisation from the relevant environmental au-
thorities to put the landlocked property to the use for which it was zoned, and to 
construct a road along the proposed access route, the “necessity” for the right of way 
has not been established. The court rejected this interpretation of “necessity” and 
concluded with reference to Trautman NO v Poole 1951 3 SA 200 (C) 207D-208A: 
“What is meant by ‘necessity’ is that the right of way must be the only reasonably 
sufficient means of gaining access to the landlocked property and not merely a con-
venient means of doing so” (500A).
The court reasoned that the fact that restrictions existed before the land may be 
used for its intended purpose was not relevant to whether a right of way was neces-
sary (500B).
The court then pointed out that the submission made on behalf of Aventura raises 
questions of practicality rather than of legal principle. Without first establishing 
a right of access the trust could hardly be expected to approach the relevant en-
vironmental authorities. The court therefore agreed with the court a quo that this 
practical conundrum could be overcome by making the grant of the right of way 
conditional upon the appropriate authorisation being obtained. The court reasoned 
that while a way of necessity ordinarily comes into being upon an order of court 
to that effect, it is usually desirable for this to be followed by the registration of a 
servitude to give notice to third parties. In the circumstances of the present case the 
court reasoned that it would be convenient for the right of way to come into effect 
only when a servitude is registered (500E).
Consequently the court considered it too early to define the route of the way of 
necessity precisely and to prepare a servitudinal diagram to reflect this. Bearing in 
mind that the trust was entitled to reasonable access and that the recreational activi-
ties of Aventura should not be unreasonably disturbed, the parties should leave this 
to later agreement. Furthermore, the dominant land is only entitled to its right of 
way upon payment of appropriate compensation, the amount of which still had to 
be determined. The court therefore held that this matter must also be provided for 
in the order (500G).
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Consequently, the supreme court of appeal set aside the orders of the court a quo 
and ordered the following (500H-501D):
“1 Subject to the owner … [of the dominant land]
 (a) obtaining all necessary permissions and authorisations to develop the dominant tenement in ac-
cordance with its permitted use as provided for in the applicable town planning regulations, and to con-
struct an access road to the dominant tenement … [over the Aventura property as servient land; and]
 (b) paying the owner of the servient tenement such compensation for the grant of the right of way 
as may be agreed upon by the owners of the two properties, or otherwise established by a court, the 
owner of the servient tenement is ordered to take all reasonable steps to register a servitude of right 
of way over the servient tenement in favour of the dominant tenement, at the cost of the owner of the 
dominant tenement, substantially in accordance with the terms set out in para 2 below.
 2 (a) The servitude is to follow a route to be agreed upon by the owners of the two properties or, in 
the absence of agreement, to be determined by a court, which route is to provide reasonably direct and 
convenient access from the national road to the dominant tenement via … [the Catwalk property].
 (b) The right of way may be used only to obtain access to the dominant tenement for its use of the 
purposes that are permitted by the applicable town planning regulations at the time of this order.”
  Evaluation
It is submitted that Zondi AJ could have reached his decision in a much more di-
rect way. If land is landlocked, as in the present case, it must be granted a way of 
necessity. Once this is established, the maxim ter naaster lage en minster schaden 
applies. The first part of the maxim instructs the judge to determine which neigh-
bouring property affords the nearest exit to a public road. This is where the judge 
has to choose between the roads proposed by the trust and the defendants. On the 
facts of the case it was clear that the nearest exit to the public road was over the 
defendants’ land. The fact that the land nearest to the dominant land was steep and 
impassable does not make a difference at this stage.
The land chosen as servient land can only avoid the burden if it is proved to be 
impassable in its entirety – for example, where it is a fully built-up urban plot or 
if the granting of the way of necessity would prove to be (extremely) detrimental 
to the interests of the owner of the servient land. If that were the case, one would 
have to turn to other neighbouring properties to find an alternative exit to the same 
or another public road. Once the nearest exit road is established, the second part of 
the maxim kicks in and instructs the judge to choose a route (which need not be the 
shortest route to the public road) that would be the least damaging to the interests of 
the owner of the would-be servient land.
The choice of the nearest exit to the public road is an objective choice and does 
not depend on a balancing of the interests of the owners of the dominant and servi-
ent land. The interests of the owner of the landlocked land are always paramount: he 
must be granted an exit to a public road. If one accepts that the institution of a way 
of necessity is based on the principle that in the public interest every plot of land 
should be capable of being exploited to its full potential, the balancing of interests 
should rather take place between the properties adjoining the landlocked land that 
could provide an exit to a public road. If the land with the nearest exit to the public 
road falls under one of the exceptions to the maxim mentioned in the Van Rensburg 
case, the adjoining land which is the second nearest to the public road should carry 
the burden. This might be the principle on which the judge in the Van Rensburg case 
framed his two exceptions to the maxim.
In the present case the Aventura property was the property which was situated 
between the landlocked property and the nearest public road. The fact that a direct 
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link could not be established because of extremely difficult terrain (529-530), and 
that therefore the link with the Rondeklip property via the servitude road was al-
most as long as the link provided by the alternative route suggested by the defend-
ants (appellants), should not play a role in deciding the first part of the maxim. This 
factor only becomes important when the second leg of the maxim is considered, 
namely that the route chosen must be the least burdensome to the servient land. This 
is what in fact happened in the present case. Since it was impracticable to construct 
an exit over the steep and highly sensitive terrain on the defendants’ land that would 
have afforded the shortest exit to the Humansdorp road, the court suggested that 
the exit proposed by the plaintiffs would cause the least damage to the defendants. 
This means that the way of necessity not only encompasses the 30-metre strip on 
the defendants’ land which had to be graded but also the registered servitude road 
over the Catwalk property, as well as the private road over the defendants’ property 
leading to the Humansdorp road. In such a case it does not seem to matter whether 
this access road traverses more than one servient land.
It is interesting to note that the judge took into account that the plaintiffs wanted 
the way of necessity to link up with the southeastern part of the property, which was 
the most suitable location for building a holiday house. One of the reasons for re-
jecting the alternative roads over the Catwalk property proposed by the defendants 
was that these roads would provide access to the northwestern part of the property 
which was not suitable for the proposed exploitation of the land as a place where 
the trustees and their families could spend a private holiday. Another reason was 
based on the first exception mentioned in the Van Rensburg case, namely that the 
alternative routes proposed by the defendant would have to cross a ravine to reach 
the landlocked property (525) and that construction would be over steep and ex-
tremely difficult or impassable terrain. In view of the proposed exploitation of the 
dominant land, the judge in my opinion was correct in linking the way of necessity 
to the most suitable location on the property. A connection of the northwestern part 
of the landlocked land with a way of necessity to the public road would not have 
led to a full exploitation of the land in accordance with the purpose of the land. But 
the remarks on the difficulties of construction involved if the route proposed by the 
defendants were chosen are only pertinent where the Catwalk property was found to 
be ter naaster lage, namely to offer the nearest exit to a public road.
A related question is whether a way of necessity is competent to promote agri-
cultural purposes but not the type of exploitation envisaged by the plaintiffs. In 
principle the use to which the enclosed land is put is immaterial. What is material is 
whether a situation of necessity exists, namely whether the dominant land is land-
locked with no exit to a public road.
Grotius in his Inleidinge 2 35 7 states clearly: “Noodweg is een weg alleen te 
gebruicken tot den oogst (harvest), tot een lijk (corpse, grave) ofte andere nood-
zakelickheid” (my emphasis). This is echoed by Van der Keessel Praelectiones on 
Grotius 2 35 7 and 8 (Afrikaans translation by Van Warmelo and others): “[N]et so 
is dieselfde reg in ’n verskeidenheid keure by ons in verband met enige ander nood-
geval (de alia quacumque necessitate) bepaal.”
This principle has been codified in article 682 of the French Civil Code, the of-
ficial English translation of which reads as follows:
“An owner whose tenement is enclaved and who has no way out to the public highway or only one 
which is insufficient for an agricultural, industrial or commercial exploitation of the property, or for 
carrying out operations of building or development, is entitled to claim over his neighbours’ tene-
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ments a way sufficient for the complete servicing of his own tenement, provided he pays compensa-
tion in proportion to the damage he may cause.”
See also SA Yster en Staal Industriële Korporasie Bpk v Van der Merwe 98  SA 
706 (A), where the way of necessity was needed with a view to preliminary planning 
and exploitation of an iron-ore deposit on the enclosed farm.
It is therefore submitted that the purpose for which the dominant tenement is 
used is irrelevant and that a purely residential use of the dominant land would also 
qualify for the granting of a way of necessity if it has no exit to a public road. Put 
differently, a way of necessity is a legal servitude or an ex lege limitation on the 
servient land in order to allow the exploitation of landlocked land to its fullest po-
tential. This means that it automatically binds the servient land and that it must be 
granted if the requirements are met irrespective of the uses to which the dominant 
land are put. The use of the dominant land or the purpose for which it is exploited 
thus does not play a role in the establishment of a way of necessity. It does, however, 
have an effect on the scope and content of the way of necessity once granted. Once 
granted, the owner of the dominant land must use the exit from his or her enclaved 
land in a manner commensurate to the use his or her land is put or the purpose for 
which his or her land is exploited. If he or she exceeds this limit, he or she can be 
interdicted to reduce the use to acceptable levels.
This links up with the question whether a way of necessity should be treated as an 
ordinary praedial servitude of way, as has apparently been done by both the judge a 
quo and the judges of the supreme court of appeal (Cape HC report 4, 5, 7, 9, 16-18 
and 33 and the SCA report par 3, 8, 9, 10 and 12). In my opinion the legal nature of 
a way of necessity differs considerably from that of a praedial servitude of way. A 
way of necessity is classified as a “legal servitude” that exists automatically over the 
servient land which offers the nearest exit to the public road; a praedial servitude is 
one of the recognised real rights which can be established over neighbouring land 
by agreement and registration or by prescription. A way of necessity automatically 
limits the content of the ownership of the servient land for the purpose of allowing 
the landlocked land (against payment of compensation) to be exploited to its full 
potential. A way of necessity therefore does not need be registered. The court order 
would render it enforceable. Since it is not an ordinary servitude, the rule that a 
praedial servitude must be exercised civiliter modo does not apply to a future selec-
tion by the plaintiff of the route the way of necessity should take or the manner in 
which the way of necessity should be used. The fact that a way of necessity must be 
exercised in accordance with the purpose for which the dominant land is used does, 
however, boil down to the use of the way in a civilised manner. This would limit the 
use thereof in the present case to ordinary vehicular use by the family and friends of 
the trustees (and not mere visitors to the Catwalk property). The compensation to be 
paid for the way does not depend upon an agreement being reached between the par-
ties, but on the court deciding a fair price. The view of the court that a way of neces-
sity should be registered in order to provide publicity to outsiders and certainty to 
the owner of the dominant land finds support in our case law but is in conflict with 
the basic nature of a way of necessity which arises automatically and terminates 
also automatically as soon as the necessity for an exit disappears. In my opinion, a 
way of necessity can only be replaced by an ordinary servitude of way if the parties 
agree on the compensation to be paid and the servitude is subsequently registered.
In the present case the dominant land is going to be used only during certain 
periods of the year, namely during holidays. This raises the question whether it was 
necessary to grant a full way of necessity (via plenum) to the owner of the dominant 
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land. Would it not have been sufficient if the owner’s entitlement was restricted to 
a via necessitatis precario? This kind of way of necessity entitles the owner to use 
the exit only in emergency situations – for instance, during harvests and floods. In 
my opinion this principle could be extended to circumstances when the landlocked 
property is not utilised on a regular basis but only during certain times of the year. 
This would also decrease the burden on the servient land and the environmental 
impact of the use of the road.
The final question to be looked at is whether landlocked land should ever be al-
lowed to become sterile. In the present case the court has decided in principle that 
the land because of its landlocked status should be entitled to an exit to the nearest 
public road and over a route that causes the least damage to the owner of the servi-
ent land. This entitlement was, however, granted on the condition that the environ-
mental bodies concerned grant the necessary consent for a road to be constructed 
over ecologically sensitive terrain on the servient land. To my mind this is putting 
the cart before the horse. The question about access to and exit from the dominant 
land should have been dealt with at the stage when the land which now constitutes 
the dominant land was partitioned off (Cape HC report 3 mentions that it was par-
titioned off in 1959) or zoned no longer as agricultural land. The difficulty here is 
that it seems that subdivision and zoning had been completed before the applicable 
environmental legislation was promulgated and that the trust is now burdened with 
an additional hurdle, namely to obtain the consent of environmental authorities for 
the building of an exit road. From the judgment it is clear that the route suggested 
by the plaintiffs would not only cause the least damage to the owners of the servi-
ent land but would also be, from an ecological point of view, the most appropriate 
route. Ultimately, it is unthinkable that the environmental authorities could refuse 
to grant some kind of ecologically sensitive exit to the public road. The fact that the 
trust were allowed to register ownership of the land renders them worthy of con-
stitutional protection by virtue of section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996. This protection would in my opinion enjoin the environmental 
authorities to grant the dominant land some kind of access to the public road to 
prevent the dominant land from becoming totally sterile.
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